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The empirical economics literature on social interactions addresses the signi¯cance of the
social context in economic decisions. Decisions of individuals who share spatial and social
milieus are likely to be interdependent. Recognizing the nature of such interdependence in
a variety of conventional and unconventional settings and measuring empirically the role of
neighborhood e®ects, or more generally, of social interactions, poses complex econometric
questions. Their resolution may be critical for a multitude of phenomena in economic and
social life and for matters of public policy.
Broadly speaking, social interactions arise when individuals (or households) a®ect each
other's decisions, preferences, information sets, and outcomes, directly rather than indirectly
through markets. These interpersonal e®ects are known as endogenous social e®ects when
own decisions and those of others in the same social milieu are inter-dependent. For in-
stance, this occurs when individuals care not only about their own outcomes but also about
the outcomes of others, such as the kinds of cars owned by their friends or their education
decisions. Individuals may also care about personal characteristics of others, that is whether
they are young or old, black or white, rich or poor, trendy or conventional, and so on, and
about other attributes of the social milieu that may not be properly characterized as delib-
erate decisions of others. Such e®ects are known as exogenous social or contextual e®ects.
We address below the particular di±culties that they pose for estimation. In addition, indi-
viduals in the same or similar social settings may act similarly because they share common
unobservable factors or face similar institutional environments. Such an interaction pattern
is known as correlated e®ects. This terminology is due to Manski (1993), who emphasized
the di±culty of separately identifying endogenous from contextual e®ects in linear-in-means
models, as well as identifying social e®ects | whether endogenous or exogenous (contextual)
| from correlated e®ects.
Social interdependencies emerge naturally if individuals share a common resource or
social space in a way that is not paid for but still generates constraints on individual action.
Theorizing in this area lies at the interface of economics, sociology and psychology and is
2often imprecise. Its spatial aspects put it ¯rmly in the realm of regional science. Terms
like social interactions, neighborhood e®ects, social capital and peer e®ects are often used
as synonyms although they may have di®erent connotations. Empirical distinctions between
endogenous, contextual and correlated e®ects are critical for policy analysis because of the
presence of a \social multiplier" as we see in more detail further below.
Joint dependence among individuals' decisions and characteristics within a spatial or
social milieu is complicated further by the fact that in many circumstances individuals in
e®ect choose their own social context. That is, individuals in choosing their friends and/or
their neighborhoods also choose their neighborhood e®ects as well. Such choices involve
information that is in part unobservable to the analyst, and therefore require making infer-
ences among the possible factors which contribute to decisions [Brock and Durlauf (2001)
and Mo±tt (2001)].
The remainder of this paper merely touches on what is truly a vast and continuously
growing literature in the social sciences. It is organized as follows. Section 2 below uses a
simple empirical framework to introduce social interactions e®ects and Section 3 the esti-
mation problems they pose in a variety of settings. It examines in a bit more detail, and
for the purpose of an example, a particular estimation approach that rests on the notion of
the social multiplier. This lends itself naturally to use of data at di®erent levels of aggrega-
tion. Section 4 emphasizes how nonlinearities improve the prospects for identi¯cation and
demonstrates their signi¯cance in the case of self selection intro groups. Section 5 takes up
neighborhood e®ects in job matching. This is a particularly interesting area because local
labor markets may involve both spatial and social interdependence. Section 6 concludes with
a brief agenda about research that we think is quite likely to bear fruit.
2 A Simple Empirical Framework
We consider a static setup, for simplicity. Individual i's action yi is a linear function of
a vector of observable individual characteristics, xi; of a vector of contextual e®ects, zº(i);




3the members of i's neighborhood º(i): That is:





E[yjjªi] + ²i; (1)
where ªi are the attributes of i's neighborhood º(i).
The endogenous social e®ect is de¯ned with respect to the expectation of a contempora-
neous endogenous variable. Abstracting at the moment from the issue that individual i may
have deliberately chosen her neighborhood, º(i); (which we take up in section 4.1 below) and
stating that conditional on individual characteristics, contextual e®ects and the event that
i is a member of neighborhood º(i) the expectation of ²i is zero, allows us to focus on the
estimation of such models. Assume that we are in a social equilibrium and that individuals
hold rational expectations over E[yjjªi]: That is, individuals' expectations are con¯rmed;
they are equal to what the model predicts. So, taking the expectations of both sides of
(1) and setting the expectation of yi equal to 1
jº(i)j
P
j2º(i) E[yjjªi] allows to solve for this
expectation. Substituting back into (1) yields a reduced form, an expression for individual
i's outcome in terms of all observables (xi;xº(i);zº(i)); where xº(i) denotes the neighborhood










zº(i) + ²i: (2)
We explore the intuition behind (1) by taking yi to be an educational attainment. Own
socioeconomic characteristics, xi; typically do a®ect educational attainment. The socioeco-
nomic characteristics of adult neighbors, including measures of economic success, are often
used as contextual e®ects and are included in zº(i): They may represent role model e®ects. In
contrast, the e®ect of educational attainment by one's peers in schools and neighborhoods,
an endogenous social e®ect, is an example of a peer group e®ect. Note those e®ects are
associated with distinct populations, which would be highlighted in a more detailed model.
A comparison of the model of (1) and its reduced form (2) allows one to demonstrate
that endogenous social e®ects generate feedbacks which magnify the e®ects of neighborhood
characteristics. That is, the e®ect of zº(i) is µ
1¡¯; and thus magni¯ed, if 0 < ¯ < 1; relative to
µ: It also con¯rms why it is tempting for empirical researchers to study individual outcomes
as functions of all observables.
4Consider the e®ect on the academic performance of a particular medical student of the
presence of women in the classroom, measured in per cent. This problem is addressed by
Arcidiacono and Nicholson (2005). According to (1), this e®ect is given by µ: However, this
would ignore the fact that there is such an e®ect on every other student, conditional on their
characteristics. Therefore, the e®ect is magni¯ed, exactly as suggested by Equ. (2), and is
now given by µ + ¯µ + ¯µ2 + ::: = µ
1¡¯:
Following the pioneering work of Datcher (1982), a great variety of individual outcomes
have been studied in the context of di®erent notions of neighborhoods. Deriving causal
results requires great care with econometrics in addition to suitable data. The model of
Equ. (1) is the bare minimum of interactions that we need in order to express essential
complexities of social interactions. In practice, empirical researchers have dealt with models
that are considerably more complex than (1). E.g., it is possible that the marginal e®ect of





j2º(i) E[yjjªi] in (1). See Section 4 below. Linearity obscures the richness
that comes with nonlinear social interactions models, like multiplicity of equilibria [Brock
and Durlauf (2001)]; explicitly allowing for multiple equilibria in the estimation of social
interactions e®ects yields striking and at times counter-intuitive policy implications [Bisin
et al. (2009)].
3 Econometric Identi¯cation
Including as contextual e®ects only neighborhood averages of individual e®ects, zº(i) ´ xº(i);
may cause failure of identi¯cation of endogenous separately from exogenous interactions.
That is, we may not be able to estimate separately coe±cients ¯ and µ by means of a
linear model like (1). Manski (1993) terms this the re°ection problem: it arises because
the direct e®ect of the social context variables zº(i) shows up together with the indirect




see this, consider regressing individual outcomes on neighborhood averages of individual
characteristics as contextual e®ects. Equ. (2) suggests that we may estimate the combined
5e®ect
®¯+µ
1¡¯ : A statistically signi¯cant estimate of the coe±cient of xº(i) in a reduced form
regression like (2) allows a researcher to infer that at least one type of social interaction is
present: either ¯; or µ; or both are nonzero. Therefore, partial identi¯cation is possible for
some type of social e®ect.
If the underlying economic model makes it possible to exclude some of neighborhood av-
erages of individual covariates, then the model parameters may be identi¯ed. More precisely,
for the identi¯cation of (1), the vector xº(i) must be linearly independent of (1;xi;zº(i)): It
is thus necessary that there be at least one element of xº(i) whose group level average is not
a causal e®ect and therefore not included in zº(i): This rather high bar for identi¯cation is a
direct consequence of linearity of the endogenous social e®ect in the behavioral model. The
importance of precision for identi¯cation and the usefulness of economic models is demon-
strated by the work of Cohen-Cole and Fletcher (2008), who take on sociologists on the
identi¯cation of endogenous versus contextual e®ects in the context of obesity.
3.1 The Social Multiplier
The fact that endogenous social interactions help amplify di®erences in the average neigh-
borhood behavior across neighborhoods can itself serve as basis for identi¯cation. Glaeser
et al. (2003) use patterns in the data to estimate a social multiplier. For a change in a par-
ticular fundamental determinant of an outcome, this is de¯ned as the ratio of a total e®ect,
which includes a direct e®ect to an individual outcome plus the sum total of the indirect
e®ects through the feedback from the e®ects on others in the social group, to the direct
e®ect. An estimate of the multiplier can be seen as the ratio of the coe±cient associated
to xº(i) in a \group level" regression of neighborhood outcomes on neighborhood attributes
(yº(i) on xº(i)), to the \individual level" coe±cient associated to xi when regressing yi on
xi. Glaeser et al. (2003) show that this ratio tends to 1=[(1 ¡ ¯)(1 + ¾¯)] as the number
of observations grows large, where ¾ = V ar(xº(i))=V ar(xi) is the portion of the variation
in individual attributes that is due to the group level variation. Therefore, one can obtain
an estimate of ¯, the endogenous social e®ect parameter of interest, from the ratio of group
6level to individual level regression coe±cients and an estimate of ¾.
This approach must deal, in practice, with dependence across decisions of individuals
belonging to the same group, which is implied by non-random sorting in terms of unobserv-
ables. Speci¯cally, if educated people prefer to have other educated people as neighbors,
the e®ect of one person's education (in an individual-level regression) will overstate the true
impact of education because it includes spillovers. So, with sorting on observables and posi-
tive social interactions, the individual level coe±cient will overstate the true individual level
relationship and the estimated social multiplier will tend to underestimate the true level
of social interactions. On the other hand, correlation between aggregate observables and
aggregate unobservables will cause the measured social multiplier to overstate the true level
of social interactions.
This approach is particularly useful in delivering a range of estimates for the endogenous
social e®ect and when individual data are hard to obtain, as in the case of crime data. For
example, Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) motivate their study of crime and social
interactions by the extraordinary variation in the incidence of crime across US metropolitan
areas over and above di®erences in fundamentals. If social interactions in criminal behavior
are present, variations in observed outcomes are larger than what would be expected from
variations in underlying fundamentals. This is because positive social interactions generate
positive spatial correlations across individuals in a given metropolitan area, which in turn
raise the overall variance of crime across metro areas.
Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (2003) report results using a multiplier-based ap-
proach with three di®erent outcomes. One is fraternity/sorority participation by students in
Dartmouth College. This setting has the advantage that students are randomly assigned to
residences in Dartmouth College, in other words there is no sorting. So, aggregating at the
room, °oor and dormitory level allows these researchers to apply the multiplier technique,
thanks to random group assignments. The impact of having drunk beer in high school on
the probability of fraternity/sorority participation rises with the level of aggregation, exactly
as the model predicts. This allows the authors to estimate the magnitude of the endogenous
social interaction e®ect.
7In practice, the authors estimate the social multiplier by ¯rst estimating individual coef-
¯cients associated with speci¯c attributes, and then forming a predicted aggregate outcome
based on aggregate characteristics and those individual-level coe±cients. They then regress
actual aggregate outcomes on these predicted aggregate outcomes; the coe±cient from this
¯nal regression tends to 1=[(1 ¡ ¯)(1 + ¾¯)] as N grows large and can thus be used to re-
cover an estimate of the social interaction parameter ¯. This technique is also applied to
crime data, as well as data on wages and human capital variables.
Graham (2008) also exploits the idea of excess variation across groups (e.g., classrooms)
to identify social interaction e®ects. The logic is quite intuitive. The within-group sample
variance of outcomes provides an estimate for the variance of individual heterogeneity (e.g.,
student ability across classrooms). The latter estimate, together with the between-group
sample variance, can be used to estimate the variance of any group-level heterogeneity (excess
variance). This excess variance can have two sources: the standard one due to group-level
heterogeneity (e.g., teacher quality) and that coming from variation in peer quality across
groups. If data on two or more subpopulations of groups are available, then a valid test for
social interactions can be performed. In fact, if the distribution of group-level heterogeneity
is the same across subpopulations, whereas that of peer quality di®ers, then it is possible to
separately identify social interaction e®ects within classrooms.
4 Nonlinearities
The linear-in-means model described above is a very special case, however rigorously de¯ned
it might be. If dependence of outcomes on their determinants is inherently nonlinear, then
full identi¯cation may be possible. This seems to be the case in the marriage market, an
important urban market. Let yi in Equ. (1) be individual i's propensity to marry in a given
time period.
Individuals are a®ected by the marriage rate in their residential communities either be-
cause they are conformists, or because of the mechanics of marital matching. That is, higher
marriage rate leaves fewer unmatched people, which a®ects one's own matching prospects
8negatively | fewer quali¯ed people being left. The reduced °ow of potential partners makes
one less choosy. The net of these two e®ects is the endogenous social e®ect with coe±cient
¯: On the other hand, someone might be more apt to marry if s/he lives in a community of
wealthier potential matches, because such matches are more likely to marry and make more
attractive spouses. This is the contextual e®ect, with coe±cient µ: Further, people in com-
munities, as de¯ned by ªi; that hold marriage in high regard are more likely to marry, but
this is not known to the econometrician. That is, E[²ijªi] = ªiD 6= 0 : the correlated e®ect
is nonzero and would appear as bias in the error of (1), where D is a vector of parameters,
as we will clarify shortly.
Drewianka (2003) explicitly considers the two sides of the marriage market in each resi-
dential community as separate but interrelated \communities" where membership is exoge-












= yjrj; j 2 fmale;femaleg
where rj denotes the fraction of the marriage market attributed to group j: Taking expec-
tations of both sides of (1) by considering it separately for each group j; using the above
expression for the group-speci¯c marriage rate, which is the endogenous social e®ect here,
and solving for the endogenous social e®ect yields:
E[yjjzj;ªj] = E [xj]® +
1
1 ¡ 2¯jrj
(®0 + E [zj]µ + ªjD); (3)
where we have simpli¯ed notation to denote by ªj the vector of characteristics of individual
i's group, by E [xj] the mean characteristics of group j; and by E [zj] the mean contextual
e®ect. When we substitute back into Equ. (1), the resulting model is identi¯ed, because rj
varies across markets.
So, what is di®erent here from Manski's re°ection problem is that the endogenous social
e®ect in an individual man's propensity to marry is not the marriage rate among men, the
mean of the individual outcome. Instead, the endogenous social e®ect is a function of the
aggregate marriage rate in the community. So, there is an additional source of variation:
the greater the number of male potential marriage partners, rmale above, the lower the
probability that a match will occur. The opportunity cost of getting married is larger when
9it is easier to search for potential alternative partners. In communities where most people
are single, marriage rates are lower | not just algebraically, but also causally. Technically,
identi¯cation of the endogenous social e®ect (the impact of marriage rates in one's group
on an individual's likelihood of marrying) is possible because the relative sizes of the two
sides of the market vary across communities and genders, adding one extra restriction to the
estimation model, thus allowing resolution of the identi¯cation problem.
4.1 Identi¯cation of Social Interactions with Self Selection to Groups
and Sorting
Roommates seem to be randomly allocated in Dartmouth College, a fact that allows Sacer-
dote (2001) to o®er one of the most interesting cases of identi¯cation of social interactions
e®ects. However, in general, presence of non-random sorting in terms of unobservables is
a major challenge for the econometric identi¯cation of social interactions models. Choos-
ing the group one belongs to implies that the random shock in the RHS of (1) may not
be independent of the other regressors. That is, deliberate choice of neighborhood º(i) by
individual i suggests that the unobserved elements in the actions of individuals who have
chosen the same neighborhood (or social group, more generally) are not independent of one
another. Conditional on their characteristics, di®erent individuals might still be in°uenced
by unobservable common factors, rendering E[²ijxi;zº(i);ªi;i 2 º(i)] 6= 0:
We formalize this notion by supposing that the evaluation of the attractiveness of a
neighborhood º may be expressed in terms of an unobservable \latent" quality variable
Q¤
i;º:2 That is, individual i evaluates neighborhood º by means of observable attributes Wi;º
which enter with weights ³; and unobservable component #i;º :
Q
¤
i;º = ³Wi;º + #i;º: (4)
Random shocks ²i and #i;º are assumed to have zero means, conditional on (are orthog-
onal to) regressors (xi;zº(i);Wi;º); across the population. If individual i were to choose
2The speci¯cation of the neighborhood quality index need not be arbitrary. It could be based on an
underlying utility index, from which the quantity decision yi also emanates [Ioannides and Zabel (2008)].
10the neighborhood which a®ords her the highest possible evaluation, then the respective
shocks would no longer have zero means. Once parametric assumptions are made about the
joint distribution of (²i;#i;º); conditional on choosing neighborhood º(i); an expression for
E[²ijxi;zº(i);ªi;i 2 º(i)] may be obtained as proportional to a function ±(³Wi;º(i)); so that
(1) may be rewritten as:





E[yjjªi] + ·±(³Wi;º(i)) + »i: (5)
Combining information on the discrete choice of neighborhood problem (4) with informa-
tion on the continuous outcome decision allows us to estimate such models.3 The additional
regressor ±(^ ³Wi;º(i)) in (5), where ^ ³ is obtained from the estimation of (4), even if it were to
also include zº(i); is generally nonlinear and therefore linearly independent of (1;xi;zº(i)): So
in sum, if it is possible to estimate the neighborhood selection rule, then correction for se-
lection bias via the mean estimated bias (the so-called Heckman correction term) introduces
an additional regressor ±(^ ³Wi;º(i)) in the RHS of (1) whose neighborhood average is not in
the RHS of Equ. (1) - in other words, it is not a causal e®ect.
Econometrically speaking, this approach supplies instruments that enable the identi-
¯cation of the model: in the reduced form regression (2) two new terms are introduced,
·±(³Wi;º(i)) and ·¯=(1 ¡ ¯) ¢ E[±(³Wi;º(i))ji 2 º(i)], but only one new parameter, ·. This
allows for identi¯cation as long as ±(³Wi;º(i)) and E[±(³Wi;º(i))ji 2 º(i)] are not linearly de-
pendent; this condition will be satis¯ed as long as there is within neighborhhood variation
in ±(³Wi;º(i)). Brock and Durlauf (2001), who were the ¯rst to make this point, also extend
it to duration data, and Sirakaya (2006) applies it to a study of recidivism.
Empirically, researchers have looked for policy experiments involving re-assignments of
individuals to groups (schools or neighborhoods) as a way to address the problem of endoge-
nous neighborhood choice. For instance, Boston's Metropolitan Council for Educational
Opportunities (METCO) program is a long-standing voluntary desegregation program. The
3Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Durlauf (2004) provide more details on the econometric properties of
the estimation process. Ioannides and Zabel, op. cit., is an application of these methods on neighborhood
selection and housing demand using con¯dential data from the US Census and the American Housing Survey.
11program assists mainly black inner-city kids from Boston public schools in commuting to and
enrolling in mainly white (and more prosperous) suburban Boston communities that accom-
modate them in their public schools. Angrist and Lang (2004) show, in seeking to evaluate
the program, that the receiving school districts, which have higher mean academic perfor-
mance than the sending ones, do experience a mean decrease due to the program. However,
they also show that the e®ects are merely \compositional", and there is little evidence of sta-
tistically signi¯cant e®ects of METCO students on their non-METCO classmates. Analysis
with micro data from one receiving district (Brookline, Massachusetts) generally con¯rms
this ¯nding, but also produces some evidence of negative e®ects on minority students in the
receiving district.
METCO is noteworthy as a social experiment; it was initiated in 1966 by civil rights ac-
tivists seeking to bring about de facto desegregation of schools. Lack of evidence of negative
peer e®ects is particularly useful for informing desegregation policy. Still, it is a voluntary
program for both sides, making self-selection a problem. There is self-selection at the in-
dividual level, by parents and children, and at the receiving school district level, by the
political process that funds the program. There are numerous factors germane to selection,
which are speci¯c to how welcome the program was by each receiving school district, which
is administered academically and ¯scally by its respective community.
To overcome the selection issues, several papers have studied neighborhood e®ects by
looking at the consequences of randomized assignment of residents of low-poverty neigh-
borhoods, as part of the Moving To Opportunity (MTO) experiment. This demonstration
randomly assigned low-income families living in public housing in ¯ve U.S. cities to one of
three groups: (a) receipt of a Section 8 housing voucher and help to relocate to a low-poverty
area ; (b) receipt of a housing voucher only, with no constraints on the type of destination
neighborhood; (c) no relocation.
Kling et. al. (2007) and Ludwig et al. (2008), among others, have used the randomized
housing voucher allocation associated with MTO to examine the impact of relocation to
neighborhoods with much lower poverty rates on a very wide set of individual behavioral
outcomes including health, labor market activity, crime, education, and more. They ¯nd
12positive e®ects of the relocation on a variety of health outcomes, including notably mental
health, but no e®ect on education and labor market outcomes.
It is important to note that there are important limitations in the extent to which the
treatment e®ects identi¯ed through relocation are informative about the nature of general
forms of neighborhood e®ects per se. First, individuals studied must be eligible for a reloca-
tion program in the ¯rst place. This typically implies that the resulting sample is special (i.e.
so as to be a resident in public housing) and may not be as sensitive to neighborhood e®ects
as other individuals. More generally, even if the eligible population is representative of the
target population, the results of an experiment based on a small sample may not extend to
broader populations because of the strong possibility that general equilibrium e®ects may
arise in that case.
Strictly speaking, for such experiments to be informative, one needs to assume no in-
terference between units, i.e. that the response of an individual to a treatment is the same
whether or not other subjects are administered the treatment. When interference is present,
the di®erence between a treatment group mean and a control group mean does not estimate
an average treatment e®ect, but rather the di®erence between two e®ects de¯ned on two
distinct sub-populations. This result is very signi¯cant: a researcher who fails to recognize
it could easily infer that a treatment is bene¯cial when in fact it is universally harmful
[Sobel(2006)].
Second, the experimental design involves relocation to new neighborhoods that are, by
design, very di®erent from baseline neighborhoods. This implies that the estimated treat-
ment e®ect measures the impact of relocating to a neighborhood where individuals initially
have few social contacts and where the individuals studied may be very di®erent than the
average resident of the new neighborhood. Therefore, any treatment e®ects identi¯ed with
this design are necessarily a composite of several factors related to signi¯cant changes in
neighborhoods that are not easily disentangled.
135 Neighborhood E®ects in Job Matching
One important instance of social interactions occurs in the context of informal job referrals
in the labor market. Here individuals exchange information about job openings, or refer
their social contacts to potential employers, thus a®ecting labor market outcomes of their
\neighbors" (be they proximate in a spatial sense, or in the space spanned by individuals'
social networks).
The use of personal networks and referrals in the labor market is very widespread. A
consensus estimate, coming from studies that span the past three decades and use a variety
of data sources both from the U.S. and from other countries, is that at least half of all jobs
are typically found through informal contacts rather than through formal search methods.
Further, the use of personal contacts has signi¯cant implications for the probability of ¯nding
a job, wage earnings, and turnover relative to other search methods [Ioannides and Loury
(2004)].
The study of informal hiring practices and labor market referrals has been closely related
to the study of neighborhood e®ects. A direct link between the use of personal networks in
job search and the presumed presence of neighborhood e®ects is given by the observation
that social networks have, to some extent, a local dimension in a geographic sense. In a study
of Toronto residents in 1978, Wellman (1996) ¯nds that 42% of yearly contacts in individual
networks took place with neighbors that lived less than one mile away. Guest and Lee (1983)
perform a similar analysis for the city of Seattle, and ¯nd that for about 35% of respondents
the majority of their non-kin social contacts resided in the same local community. Otani
(1999) uses 1986 General Social Survey data for the U.S. (in a comparative Japan-U.S.
study) and ¯nds that roughly one in ¯ve contacts listed in individual networks are physical
neighbors.
Most relevantly to the study of labor market referrals, Lee and Campbell (1999) use data
from a 1988 survey of Nashville, Tennessee to look at social ties with immediate neighbors.
Their de¯nition of \micro-neighborhoods" consists of \partial face blocks consisting of 10
adjacent housing units each, ¯ve on either side of a single street." They ¯nd that 31% of
14these immediate neighbors are judged close or very close by respondents. Further, they
speci¯cally ask respondents to whom they would turn for help in ¯nding a job. About 13%
of helpers in these networks resided in the respondents' micro-neighborhoods; 73% resided
elsewhere in Nashville; the residual 14% were not Nashville residents.
Given this premise, a number of recent studies have looked for evidence that local social
interactions within neighborhoods a®ect employment and wage outcomes. As we discussed
earlier, the main estimation problem in the analysis of neighborhood e®ects (and in the
social interactions literature in general) is the possibility that any co-movements in outcomes
among members of the same neighborhood (or reference group, more generally) may be due
not so much to social interactions but rather to the presence of correlated unobservables at
the neighborhood level. Correlation in unobserved attributes may arise because of positive
sorting, or because of unobserved shocks that a®ect the entire neighborhood (for instance,
in the case of labor market outcomes, a plant closing that a®ects employment in the local
area), or other unobserved neighborhood-wide institutions that a®ect the outcome under
consideration.
Weinberg et al. (2004) use con¯dential longitudinal data from the NLSY79 to investigate
the presence of social interaction e®ects at the neighborhood level on labor market activity.
They also examine the possibility that any correlation in outcomes across neighborhood
residents may be explained by the mismatch hypothesis: this theory argues that residents of
certain urban neighborhoods incur adverse labor market outcomes because jobs are located
far from these neighborhoods. Their identi¯cation strategy is to exploit the panel dimension
of the data to include individual ¯xed e®ects, as well as time-varying individual e®ects that
depend on individual deviations from a typical experience pro¯le.
They ¯nd evidence that simple OLS estimation over-estimates the impact of neighbor-
hood social interactions on labor market outcomes, and under-estimates the role of spatial
mismatch. They study the impact of employment of adult males in the neighborhood on
respondents' annual hours worked. Under their preferred speci¯cations with ¯xed e®ects,
they ¯nd that a one standard deviation increase in neighborhood employment is associated
with a 9.5% increase in annual hours worked for adult males on average. In contrast, the
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mismatch) on hours is a 3.6% increase. When they introduce controls for individual speci¯c
experience e®ects, the estimated e®ects on hours of neighborhood employment and access to
jobs become, respectively, 6.1% and 4.7%.
Topa (2001) analyzes a structural model of transitions into and out of unemployment to
estimate the impact of any local social interaction e®ects on employment outcomes. He posits
that individuals may receive useful information about job openings from their employed so-
cial contacts but not from their unemployed ones. This positive local feedback implies that
the stationary distribution of unemployment in a simulated city exhibits positive spatial cor-
relation. He estimates the model parameters via indirect inference, comparing the simulated
spatial distribution of unemployment with the empirical one, using Census data for Chicago
in 1980 and 1990.
The identi¯cation strategy in that paper relies on: ¯rst, the assumption that neighboring
census tracts can a®ect a given tract's employment outcomes only through their employment
levels, and not through their own attributes; and second, on the use of local community
boundaries (as identi¯ed by residents) to distinguish local social interactions from other
types of spatially correlated shocks. The results indicate that a one standard deviation
increase in neighborhood employment increases expected employment by between 0.6 and
1.3 percentage points. Further, the estimated spillover e®ects are stronger in tracts with
lower education levels and with higher fractions of minorities. This ¯nding is consistent with
the direct evidence on referral e®ects in both sociology and economics.
The analysis also points to an interesting asymmetry: if one raises the amount of in-
formation (proxied by neighborhood employment) available in a disadvantaged tract and
lowers it in a well-o® tract by the same amount, the positive e®ect on expected employment
in the former tract is roughly twice as large, in absolute value, as the negative e®ect in
the latter tract. This is due to the di®erent initial conditions in the two tracts in terms of
education levels and other attributes, and the fact that the estimated spillovers vary across
these attributes. This has potentially interesting implications for public housing policy, for
instance with regard to the idea of dispersing public housing instead of concentrating it in a
16few areas.
The recent study that makes the strongest case to date for the e®ects of geographical
proximity on job market outcomes is Bayer et al. (2008). They adopt a novel strategy to
identify and estimate local referral e®ects in the labor market. The basic idea in this paper
is to look for spatial clustering of individual work locations for a given residential location,
as evidence of local referral e®ects. In order to identify labor market referrals from other
spatially correlated e®ects, the authors estimate the propensity to work together (in the
same city block) for pairs of workers who reside in a given city block, controlling for the
baseline propensity to work together for residents in nearby blocks (within a reference group
of blocks).
The crucial identifying assumption here is that workers can choose residential locations
down to a group of blocks, but cannot pinpoint an exact block of choice. Therefore, after
controlling for reference group level sorting, the assignment of individuals to speci¯c blocks
is essentially random and provides a useful source of variation to identify local referral ef-
fects. Measures of the extent of sorting on observable attributes at the block level suggest
that this assumption is at least plausible. This paper also employs individual ¯xed e®ects to
further control for unobserved heterogeneity and examines alternative speci¯cations to ad-
dress the possibility of reverse causation (i.e., work colleagues giving referrals about desirable
residential locations).
Bayer et al. (2008) ¯nd that, on average, a one standard deviation increase in potential
referrals raises expected labor earnings by between 2.0 and 3.7 percentage points, and hours
worked per week by between 0.3 and 1.8 hours for men. For women, the e®ect on labor force
participation and expected employment varies between 0.8 and 3.6 percentage points across
speci¯cations. Interestingly, they do not ¯nd a signi¯cant earnings e®ect for women, which
is consistent with the direct evidence on the productivity and wage e®ects of informal job
contacts for women relative to men. Further, the estimated referral e®ects are stronger for
less educated workers, younger workers, and Asians or Hispanics. These results are broadly
consistent with direct survey evidence on labor market referrals.
A handful of papers exploit non-neighborhood natural experiments to assess the impact
17of informal contacts on labor market outcomes. Lalive (2003) studies the possibility that
unemployment outcomes may be a®ected by social interactions among workers by exploiting
a \natural" experiment that extended unemployment bene¯ts for a well-speci¯ed subset of
workers in Austria. The idea is to see whether this exogenous shock to unemployment of
eligible workers spilled over to ineligible workers that were in close contact (in terms of their
social distance) with a sizable number of eligible workers.
The author essentially uses a di®erence-in-di®erence approach that compares the di®er-
ence in unemployment outcomes for ineligible workers that had a majority vs. a minority of
eligible workers in their peer group, across both treatment and control geographic regions.
The paper ¯nds signi¯cant social interactions e®ects in unemployment: when the fraction of
program eligible workers in one's peer group goes from zero to 100% the risk of long-term
unemployment for an ineligible worker increases by 6.7 percentage points. The results appear
to be robust to a wide variety of controls for potential general equilibrium e®ects, di®erences
in local market interactions and social interactions across regions, and unobserved di®erences
in productivity.
Laschever (2008) exploits the random assignment of young American men to the military
during World War I to de¯ne exogenously constructed peer groups. He then measures the
impact of a group's unemployment rate from the 1930 Census on a veteran's own likelihood of
being employed. The magnitude of the e®ect is quite large: a one percentage point increase
in his peers' unemployment rate is associated with a half percentage point decrease in one's
own expected employment. He further decomposes this e®ect into the endogenous and the
contextual components and ¯nds that the endogenous e®ect is at least four times as large
as the contextual one. This lends some support to the hypothesis that the estimated social
e®ect is due to referrals or informal job contacts.
We also wish to mention two papers that, in our opinion, push the boundaries of current
research on neighborhood e®ects, even though in the context of applications other than job
market matching. Cohen-Cole and Zanella (2008) study how usage of public assistance is
in°uenced by one's neighbors behavior. Their study builds on the earlier work by Bertrand
et al. (2001) by trying to disentangle an information exchange e®ect from preference inter-
18dependence. Assuming one can correctly identify social interaction e®ects, do individual
outcomes comove because individuals share information about eligibility, application pro-
cedures and other bureaucratic details, or rather because higher welfare uptake in one's
community reduces the stigma associated with such outcomes? The authors' identifying
assumption is that information is shared only within racial and ethnic groups, whereas the
stigma e®ect operates across other groups as well. In other words, whereas social proximity
matters for information exchanges, spatial proximity is more relevant for stigma. While this
may be an extreme assumption, it seems like a promising ¯rst step to disentangle speci¯c
mechanisms through which social interactions e®ects operate.
Conley and Udry (2008) study social learning in technology adoption in the context of
the adoption of pineapple cultivation in Ghana. The challenge, again, is how to convincingly
distinguish social learning from a situation in which agents' actions comove merely because of
common unobservable shocks or attributes. The authors have painstakingly collected direct
measures of individual information neighborhoods by tracing individual farmers' networks.
They then argue convincingly that these are distinct from geographic neighborhoods that
characterize the extent of common growing conditions. Further, they gain a reasonable
identifying assumption by analyzing a model of rational learning that delivers the following
implication: a farmer's choice of fertilizer will imitate only those of \successful" neighbors. On
the other hand, if growing conditions are serially and spatially correlated, the econometrician
will observe similar comovements in technology choice regardless of whether neighbors' pro¯ts
are unexpectedly high or low following adoption.
6 An Agenda
The analysis in Bayer et al. (2008) points to the potentially large bene¯ts of analyzing
detailed restricted access data available from the Census Research Data Centers, perhaps
using a combination of data sources, such as the decennial Census as well as the American
Housing Survey data, which are collected at a higher frequency. The innovative identi¯cation
strategy employed in this paper would not be feasible without the detailed geographic infor-
19mation available in these restricted access data. In addition, it seems particularly promising
to expand the set of traditional neighborhood e®ects questions to include such applications
as personal bankruptcy, home foreclosures, and the dynamics of housing supply and demand.
In this context, valuable insights will be gained by ongoing e®orts by researchers with di-
verse interests to merge detailed Census data with consumer credit, housing transactions,
and mortgage payments panel data.
Several recent works emphasize how much we stand to learn from massive new data sets
that have become recently available and are only slowly being utilized. As Kleinberg (2008)
points out, the past decade has witnessed a coming-together of the technological networks
that connect computers in the internet and the social networks that have always connected
people since the emergence of human societies. Research by Mayer and Puller (2007), who
merge con¯dential administrative data and information from Facebook.com to study the
structure and composition of social networks on university campuses and investigate the
processes that lead to their formation, is indicative of the potential in this area.
Gonzalez et al. (2008) is a good case in point on what we can learn from these vast new
data sources. They use data from 100,000 anonymous mobile phone users whose positions are
tracked over a six-month period. They show that human trajectories show high temporal and
spatial regularity, with time-independent individual time paths and regular frequenting of
particular locations. Once corrected for individual characteristics, paths obey a single spatial
distribution. One would think that this is likely to be in°uenced by physical infrastructure of
the locales where they live. This appears to be in contrast to previous research that suggests
the human movements follow random walks with fat tailed displacements and waiting-time
distributions. Data of this type go much beyond the naive but common perception that what
can be learned about social interactions would be based only on social networking sites and
the like. Modern information and communication technologies mediate numerous modes of
interactions that may be directly interpersonal or involve self-expression in the intellectual,
scienti¯c or opinion sphere.
We also believe it is very important to go beyond the simple detection and estimation
of generic social interaction e®ects to try to better understand and disentangle the speci¯c
20mechanisms through which social e®ects operate. For instance, is it social learning or social
in°uence? In other words, is it information or preferences? One possible approach to identify
these separately consists of using di®erent assumptions about the shape of these mechanisms
as a function of the number of social contacts. There is some evidence [see Bandiera and
Rasul (2006)] that an information e®ect may be concave in number of contacts. This makes
intuitive sense as it is easy to model an information exchange process in which the marginal
\new" information acquired from additional contacts is less and less valuable. On the other
hand, a social in°uence e®ect might very plausibly be linear or even convex. For instance, the
reduction in stigma associated with applying for public assistance could grow proportionately
larger as more and more people use welfare. Work in progress by Bayer, Ross, and Topa aims
at exploring this approach using di®erent functional form assumptions for various e®ects.
Another important area for future research concerns the endogeneity of social networks:
how do networks change over time, as agents rationally anticipate the e®ect of establish-
ing/severing a tie on their future payo®s? Bisin et al (2006) analyze a model of rational
social interactions, in which agents are forward-looking and evaluate future costs and ben-
e¯ts of social ties. This seems like a promising approach that may deliver useful testable
implications for the shape of social interaction e®ects and help identify them separately from
correlated e®ects. On the empirical front, several working papers (Bifulco et al. (2008),
Weinberg (2007)) use detailed data on individual networks and outcomes of teenagers (Ad-
dHealth), to estimate models of endogenous network formation and evolution over time and
the impact on behavior [Fryer and Torelli (2006)].
On the theoretical front, three excellent new books on networks, Goyal (2007), Jackson
(2008) and Vega-Redondo (2007), will likely help integrate the large amount of theoretical
research on network theory. New advanced on econometric techniques, like by Bramoull¶ e
et al. (2009) and others, o®er new ways to take advantage of network structure in identi-
fying decisions in network settings. They can be augmented by means of non-parametric
techniques, like the ones proposed by Brock and Durlauf (2007), who examine the identi¯-
ability of parameters of binary choice with social interactions models when the distribution
of random payo® terms is unknown. Their results on partial identi¯cation of endogenous
21social interactions in some special cases of pattern reversals (between contextual e®ects and
endogenous outcomes) are particularly interesting and lend themselves to network-based
extensions.
More generally, it would be very useful to write general models in order to derive impli-
cations for the joint distribution of income, human capital, possibly ethnicity by integrating
job network e®ects on the one hand with sorting and intergenerational transmission pro-
cesses on the other. While reminiscent of ideas in Benabou (1993), this would be a novel
research agenda and would involve writing down processes at di®erent time scales (business
cycle frequency, life cycle frequency, and intergenerational frequency) and then solving for
their equilibrium invariant distribution. It would then be interesting to think about how
individual networks might evolve at these di®erent time scales. At the cyclical frequency,
people might optimally adjust their network as well as the number of contacts (which in
some sense is a measure of search e®ort) depending on the value of search and their cost
of time. At the same time, people may adjust their network size and/or composition based
on the previous generation's experience (thus providing another inter-generational linkage).
Location{speci¯c social networks can provide additional motivation for community-based
amenities, that may re°ect peer e®ects [ Epple et al. (2009)].
In addition, it would be fruitful to incorporate the use of personal contacts into full-
°edged macro models of job search a la Mortensen and Pissarides, Shimer, etc. This may
give us useful insights into the ways in which an aggregate matching function may change
as a function of alternative search methods and intensities. Further, the choice of search
method could be endogenized in the context of a formal search model, in order to study how
the choice between formal and informal methods may vary according to di®erent market
conditions, and what implications that has on outcomes. Empirically, it would also be useful
to study whether the use of personal contacts varies with the business cycle.
Finally, it would be very interesting to incorporate informal job search methods into urban
economics models, to see how they a®ect neighborhood dynamics, as well as equilibrium wage
and rent distributions within a city. Zenou (2008) takes a ¯rst stab at this research agenda,
by analyzing the role of informal contacts and referrals in an explicit urban model in which
22agents are located at varying distances from jobs, and space a®ects the extent of social
interactions. He ¯nds that an increase in weak tie interactions lowers unemployment but
also increases equilibrium rents in the city. Under certain conditions, an increase in weak
ties also induces a higher equilibrium wage.
A number of areas of neighborhood e®ects research are particularly relevant for policy.
Mo±tt (2001) lays down a basic approach. Large-scale social experiments, like MTO, as well
as small-scale ones, like METCO, naturally lend themselves to formal evaluation by means
of the tools of the body of knowledge known as neighborhood e®ects. They may serve as
settings for assessing arguments in favor and against deliberate racial and income integration
of, respectively, residential communities and of public educational institutions as forms of
social policy.
Alongside more traditional, large-scale randomized experiments, other, small-scale social
experiments in local neighborhoods, social networks and peer e®ects may also be quite fruit-
ful. Falk and Ichino (2006) conduct a ¯eld experiment in which worker groups are randomly
formed, and ¯nd that worker productivity is a®ected by peers in one's team; Palacios-Huerta
(2003) runs social interactions experiments in the lab and ¯nds that learning contains a social
interactions dimension.
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